TY  - JOUR
AU  - Niederle,Muriel
AU  - Yariv,Leeat
TI  - Decentralized Matching with Aligned Preferences
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 14840
PY  - 2009
Y2  - April 2009
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w14840
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w14840.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
Muriel Niederle
Department of Economics
579 Serra Mall
Stanford University
Stanford, CA 94305-6072
Tel: 650/723-7359
Fax: 650/725-5702
E-Mail: niederle@stanford.edu

Leeat Yariv
Division of Humanities & Social Sciences, Caltech
1200 E. California Blvd
Pasadena, CA 91125
E-Mail: lyariv@hss.caltech.edu
AB  - We study a simple model of a decentralized market game in which firms make directed offers to workers. We focus on markets in which agents have aligned preferences. When agents have complete information or when there are no frictions in the economy, there exists an equilibrium that yields the stable match. In the presence of market frictions and preference uncertainty, harsher assumptions on the richness of the economy have to be made in order for decentralized markets to generate stable outcomes in equilibrium.
ER  -