NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

Decentralized Matching with Aligned Preferences

Muriel Niederle, Leeat Yariv

NBER Working Paper No. 14840
Issued in April 2009
NBER Program(s):IO, LS

We study a simple model of a decentralized market game in which firms make directed offers to workers. We focus on markets in which agents have aligned preferences. When agents have complete information or when there are no frictions in the economy, there exists an equilibrium that yields the stable match. In the presence of market frictions and preference uncertainty, harsher assumptions on the richness of the economy have to be made in order for decentralized markets to generate stable outcomes in equilibrium.

download in pdf format
   (318 K)

email paper

Machine-readable bibliographic record - MARC, RIS, BibTeX

Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w14840

Users who downloaded this paper also downloaded* these:
Lee and Schwarz w14922 Interviewing in Two-Sided Matching Markets
Fox w14382 Estimating Matching Games with Transfers
Avery, Lee, and Roth w20774 College Admissions as Non-Price Competition: The Case of South Korea
Becker A Theory of Marriage
Abdulkadiroglu, Agarwal, and Pathak w21046 The Welfare Effects of Coordinated Assignment: Evidence from the NYC HS Match
 
Publications
Activities
Meetings
NBER Videos
Themes
Data
People
About

National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Ave., Cambridge, MA 02138; 617-868-3900; email: info@nber.org

Contact Us