TY  - JOUR
AU  - Aghion,Philippe
AU  - Reenen,John Van
AU  - Zingales,Luigi
TI  - Innovation and Institutional Ownership
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 14769
PY  - 2009
Y2  - March 2009
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w14769
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w14769.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
Philippe Aghion
Department of Economics
Harvard University
1805 Cambridge St
Cambridge, MA 02138
Tel: 617/495-6675
Fax: 617/495-4341
E-Mail: paghion@fas.harvard.edu

John Van Reenen
Department of Economics
London School of Economics
Centre for Economic Performance
Houghton Street
London WC2A 2AE
UNITED KINGDOM
Tel: 00 44 207/955-6976
Fax: 00 44 207/955-6848
E-Mail: j.vanreenen@lse.ac.uk

Luigi Zingales
Booth School of Business
The University of Chicago
5807 S. Woodlawn Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
Tel: 773/702-3196
Fax: 773/834-2081
E-Mail: luigi.zingales@ChicagoBooth.edu
AB  - We find that institutional ownership in publicly traded companies is associated with more innovation (measured by cite-weighted patents). To explore the mechanism through which this link arises, we build a model that nests the lazy-manager hypothesis with career-concerns, where institutional owners increase managerial incentives to innovate by reducing the career risk of risky projects. The data supports the career concerns model. First, whereas the lazy manager hypothesis predicts a substitution effect between institutional ownership and product market competition (and managerial entrenchment generally), the career-concern model allows for complementarity. Empirically, we reject substitution effects. Second, CEOs are less likely to be fired in the face of profit downturns when institutional ownership is higher. Finally, using instrumental variables, policy changes and disaggregating by type of owner we find that the effect of institutions on innovation does not appear to be due to endogenous selection.
ER  -