TY  - JOUR
AU  - Bulow,Jeremy
AU  - Levin,Jonathan
AU  - Milgrom,Paul
TI  - Winning Play in Spectrum Auctions
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 14765
PY  - 2009
Y2  - March 2009
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w14765
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w14765.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
Jeremy I. Bulow
Stanford University
Graduate School of Business
Stanford, CA  94305-7298
Tel: 650/723-2160
Fax: 650/725-8916
E-Mail: jbulow@stanford.edu

Jonathan D. Levin
Stanford University
Department of Economics
579 Serra Mall
Stanford, CA  94305-6072
Tel: 650/723-5962
E-Mail: jdlevin@stanford.edu

Paul Milgrom
Stanford University
Department of Economics
579 Serra Mall
Stanford, CA   94305-6072
E-Mail: milgrom@stanford.edu
AB  - We describe factors that make bidding in large spectrum auctions complex -- including exposure and budget problems, the role of timing within an ascending auction, and the possibilities for price forecasting -- and how economic and game-theoretic analysis can assist bidders in overcoming these problems. We illustrate with the case of the FCC's Advanced Wireless Service auction, in which a new entrant, SpectrumCo, faced all these problems yet managed to purchase nationwide coverage at a discount of roughly a third relative to the prices paid by its incumbent competitors in the same auction, saving more than a billion dollars.
ER  -