NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

Towards an Efficient Mechanism for Prescription Drug Procurement

Kyna Fong, Michael Schwarz

NBER Working Paper No. 14718
Issued in February 2009
NBER Program(s):   HE

This paper applies ideas from mechanism design to model procurement of prescription drugs. We present a mechanism for government-funded market-driven drug procurement that achieves very close to full static efficiency -- all members have access to all but at most a single drug -- without distorting incentives for innovation.

download in pdf format
   (263 K)

email paper

The NBER Bulletin on Aging and Health provides summaries of publications like this.  You can sign up to receive the NBER Bulletin on Aging and Health by email.

This paper is available as PDF (263 K) or via email.

Machine-readable bibliographic record - MARC, RIS, BibTeX

Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w14718

Users who downloaded this paper also downloaded these:
Duggan and Scott Morton w10930 The Distortionary Effects of Government Procurement: Evidence from Medicaid Prescription Drug Purchasing
Novaes and Zingales w9763 Bureaucracy as a Mechanism to Generate Information
Lewis and Bajari w17647 Moral Hazard, Incentive Contracts and Risk: Evidence from Procurement
Neal w16710 The Design of Performance Pay in Education
Kaestner and Khan w16011 Medicare Part D and its Effect on the Use of Prescription Drugs, Use of Other Health Care Services and Health of the Elderly
 
Publications
Activities
Meetings
NBER Videos
Data
People
About

Support
National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Ave., Cambridge, MA 02138; 617-868-3900; email: info@nber.org

Contact Us