NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

Median Stable Matching

Michael Schwarz, M. Bumin Yenmez

NBER Working Paper No. 14689
Issued in January 2009
NBER Program(s):Labor Studies

We define the median stable matching for two-sided matching markets with side payments and prove constructively that it exists.

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Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w14689

Published: "Median Stable Matching for Markets with Wages" joint with Michael Schwarz – Journal of Economic Theory, Volume 146, Number 2, March 2011, Pages 619-637

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