TY  - JOUR
AU  - Athey,Susan
AU  - Levin,Jonathan
AU  - Seira,Enrique
TI  - Comparing Open and Sealed Bid Auctions: Evidence from Timber Auctions
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 14590
PY  - 2008
Y2  - December 2008
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w14590
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w14590.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
Susan Athey
Graduate School of Business
Stanford University
655 Knight Way
Stanford, CA 94305
Tel: 650/725-8696
Fax: 650/725-5702
E-Mail: athey@fas.harvard.edu

Jonathan D. Levin
Stanford University
Department of Economics
579 Serra Mall
Stanford, CA  94305-6072
Tel: 650/723-5962
E-Mail: jdlevin@stanford.edu

Enrique Seira
Centro de Investigación Económica
ITAM
Ave. Santa Teresa # 930
Mexico, D. F. 10700, Mexico
E-Mail: eseira@economia.gob.mx
AB  - We study entry and bidding patterns in sealed bid and open auctions with heterogeneous bidders. Using data from U.S. Forest Service timber auctions, we document a set of systematic effects of auction format: sealed bid auctions attract more small bidders, shift the allocation towards these bidders, and can also generate higher revenue. We show that a private value auction model with endogenous participation can account for these qualitative effects of auction format. We estimate the model's parameters and show that it can explain the quantitative effects as well. Finally, we use the model to provide an assessment of bidder competitiveness, which has important consequences for auction choice.
ER  -