TY  - JOUR
AU  - Sweeting,Andrew
TI  - The Strategic Timing Incentives of Commercial Radio Stations: An Empirical Analysis Using Multiple Equilibria
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 14506
PY  - 2008
Y2  - November 2008
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w14506
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w14506.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
Andrew Sweeting
Department of Economics
213 Social Sciences
Box 90097
Duke University
Durham, NC 27708
Tel: 919 660 1883
E-Mail: atsweet@duke.edu
AB  - Commercial radio stations and advertisers have potentially conflicting interests about when commercial breaks should be played. This paper estimates an incomplete information timing game to examine stations' equilibrium timing incentives. It shows how identification can be aided by the existence of multiple equilibria when appropriate data are available. It finds that stations want to play their commercials at the same time, suggesting that mechanisms exist which align the incentives of stations with the interests of advertisers. It also shows that coordination incentives are much stronger during drivetime hours, when more listeners switch stations, and in smaller markets.
ER  -