Optimal Taxation and Social Insurance with Endogenous Private Insurance
NBER Working Paper No. 14403
Issued in October 2008
NBER Program(s): EFG HC PE
This paper characterizes the welfare gains from redistributive taxation and social insurance in an environment where the private sector provides partial insurance. We analyze stylized models in which adverse selection, pre-existing information, or imperfect optimization in private insurance markets create a role for government intervention. We derive simple formulas that map reduced-form empirical estimates into quantitative predictions for optimal tax and social insurance policy. Applications to unemployment and health insurance show that taking private market insurance into account matters significantly for optimal benefit levels given existing empirical estimates of the key parameters.
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- Raj Chetty & Emmanuel Saez, 2010.
"Optimal Taxation and Social Insurance with Endogenous Private Insurance,"
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy,
American Economic Association, vol. 2(2), pages 85-114, May.
- Optimal Taxation and Social Insurance with Endogenous Private Insurance, Raj Chetty, Emmanuel Saez, in Income Taxation, Trans-Atlantic Public Economics Seminar (TAPES), American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 2(2), May 2010
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