NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

Landed Interests and Financial Underdevelopment in the United States

Raghuram G. Rajan, Rodney Ramcharan

NBER Working Paper No. 14347
Issued in September 2008
NBER Program(s):   CF   POL

Landed elites in the United States in the early decades of the twentieth century played a significant role in restricting the development of finance. States that had higher land concentration passed more restrictive banking legislation. At the county level, counties with very concentrated land holdings tended to have disproportionately fewer banks per capita. Banks were especially scarce both when landed elites' incentive to suppress finance, as well as their ability to exercise local influence, was higher. Finally, the resulting financial underdevelopment was negatively correlated with subsequent manufacturing growth. We draw lessons from this episode for understanding economic development.

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Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w14347

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