TY  - JOUR
AU  - Leslie,Phillip
AU  - Oyer,Paul
TI  - Managerial Incentives and Value Creation: Evidence from Private Equity
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 14331
PY  - 2008
Y2  - September 2008
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w14331
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w14331.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
Phillip Leslie
Anderson School of Management
UCLA
Box 951481
Los Angeles, CA 90095
Tel: 650-387-5498
E-Mail: pleslie@anderson.ucla.edu

Paul Oyer
Graduate School of Business
Stanford University
518 Memorial Way
Stanford, CA 94305-5015
Tel: 650/736-1047
Fax: 650/725-0468
E-Mail: pauloyer@stanford.edu
M3  - presented at "New World of Private Equity Conference", April 4-5, 2008
AB  - We analyze the differences between companies owned by private equity (PE) investors and similar public companies.  We document that PE-owned companies use much stronger incentives for their top executives and have substantially higher debt levels.  However, we find little evidence that PE-owned firms outperform public firms in profitability or operational efficiency.  We also show that the compensation and debt differences between PE-owned companies and public companies disappear over a very short period (one to two years) after the PE-owned firm goes public.  Our results raise questions about whether and how PE firms and the incentives they put in place create value.
ER  -