@techreport{NBERw14331,
 title = "Managerial Incentives and Value Creation: Evidence from Private Equity",
 author = "Phillip Leslie and Paul Oyer",
 institution = "National Bureau of Economic Research",
 type = "Working Paper",
 series = "Working Paper Series",
 number = "14331",
 year = "2008",
 month = "September",
 URL = "http://www.nber.org/papers/w14331",
 abstract = {We analyze the differences between companies owned by private equity (PE) investors and similar public companies.  We document that PE-owned companies use much stronger incentives for their top executives and have substantially higher debt levels.  However, we find little evidence that PE-owned firms outperform public firms in profitability or operational efficiency.  We also show that the compensation and debt differences between PE-owned companies and public companies disappear over a very short period (one to two years) after the PE-owned firm goes public.  Our results raise questions about whether and how PE firms and the incentives they put in place create value.},
}