The Welfare Impact of Reducing Choice in Medicare Part D: A Comparison of Two Regulation Strategies
Motivated by widely publicized concerns that there are "too many" plans, we structurally estimate (and validate) an equilibrium model of the Medicare Part D market to study the welfare impacts of two feasible, similar-sized approaches for reducing choice. One reduces the maximum number of firm offerings regionally; the other removes plans providing donut hole coverage - consumers' most valued dimension. We find welfare losses are far smaller when coupled with elimination of a dimension of differentiation, as in the latter approach. We illustrate our findings' relevance under current health care reforms, and consider the merits of instead imposing ex ante competition for entry.
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Copy CitationClaudio Lucarelli, Jeffrey Prince, and Kosali Simon, "The Welfare Impact of Reducing Choice in Medicare Part D: A Comparison of Two Regulation Strategies," NBER Working Paper 14296 (2008), https://doi.org/10.3386/w14296.
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Published Versions
Claudio Lucarelli & Jeffrey Prince & Kosali Simon, 2012. "The Welfare Impact Of Reducing Choice In Medicare Part D: A Comparison Of Two Regulation Strategies," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 53(4), pages 1155-1177, November. citation courtesy of