Hiring Cheerleaders: Board Appointments of "Independent" Directors

Lauren Cohen, Andrea Frazzini, Christopher Malloy

NBER Working Paper No. 14232
Issued in August 2008
NBER Program(s):   AP   CF

We provide evidence that firms appoint independent directors who are overly sympathetic to management, while still technically independent according to regulatory definitions. We explore a subset of independent directors for whom we have detailed, micro-level data on their views regarding the firm prior to being appointed to the board: sell-side analysts who are subsequently appointed to the board of companies they previously covered. We find that boards appoint overly optimistic analysts who are also poor relative performers. The magnitude of the optimistic bias is large: 82.0% of appointed recommendations are strong-buy/buy recommendations, compared to 56.9% for all other analyst recommendations. We find that appointed analysts' optimism is stronger at precisely those times when firms' benefits are larger, and that appointing firms increase earnings management, and perform poorly, following these board appointments.

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This paper was revised on December 5, 2011

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Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w14232

Published: Lauren Cohen & Andrea Frazzini & Christopher J. Malloy, 2012. "Hiring Cheerleaders: Board Appointments of "Independent" Directors," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 58(6), pages 1039-1058, June. citation courtesy of

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