NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

An Institutional Theory of Public Contracts: Regulatory Implications

Pablo T. Spiller

NBER Working Paper No. 14152
Issued in August 2008

---- Acknowledgements -----

Jeffrey A. Jacobs Distinguished Professor of Business and Technology, Haas School of Business, University of California, Berkeley, and Research Associate, NBER. This paper benefited from comments received at various workshops and seminars, including the World Bank, the Nice Conference on Regulation and Deregulation, University of California, Irvine, and ISNIE, as well as from an anonymous referee and from conversations with Benito Arruñada, Bryan Hong, Claude Menard, Robert Seamans, Steve Tadelis, Richard Wang, and Oliver Williamson. Bryan Hong, Richard Wang and Robert Seamans provided useful research assistance. This research benefited from funding from the Jeffrey A. Jacobs Distinguished Professorship Chair in Business and Technology at the Haas School of Business of the University of California, Berkeley. I can be contacted at spiller@haas.berkeley.edu. The views expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research.

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