TY  - JOUR
AU  - Alesina,Alberto F.
AU  - Holden,Richard T.
TI  - Ambiguity and Extremism in Elections
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 14143
PY  - 2008
Y2  - June 2008
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w14143
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w14143.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
Alberto F. Alesina
Department of Economics
Harvard University
Littauer Center 210
Cambridge, MA 02138
Tel: 617/495-8388
Fax: 617/495-7730
E-Mail: aalesina@harvard.edu

Richard T. Holden
University of Chicago
Booth School of Business
Room 528
5807 S Woodlawn Ave
Chicago,IL 60637
Tel: 773.834.3184
E-Mail: richard.holden@chicagobooth.edu
AB  - We analyze a model in which voters are uncertain about the policy preferences of candidates. Two forces affect the probability of electoral success: proximity to the median voter and campaign contributions. First, we show how campaign contributions affect elections. Then we show how the candidates may wish to announce a range of policy preferences, rather than a single point. This strategic ambiguity balances voter beliefs about the appeal of candidates both to the median voter and to the campaign contributors. If primaries precede a general election, they add another incentive for ambiguity, because in the primaries the candidates do not want to reveal too much information, to maintain some freedom of movement in the policy space for the general election. Ambiguity has an option value.
ER  -