@techreport{NBERw14045,
 title = "Does Trade Foster Contract Enforcement?",
 author = "James E. Anderson",
 institution = "National Bureau of Economic Research",
 type = "Working Paper",
 series = "Working Paper Series",
 number = "14045",
 year = "2008",
 month = "May",
 URL = "http://www.nber.org/papers/w14045",
 abstract = {Contract enforcement is probabilistic, but the probability depends on rules and processes.  A stimulus to trade may induce traders to alter rules or processes to improve enforcement. In the model of this paper, such a positive knock-on effect occurs when the elasticity of supply of traders is sufficiently high. Negative knock-on is possible when the elasticity is low. Enforcement strategies in competing markets are complements (substitutes) if the supply of traders is sufficiently elastic (inelastic). The model provides a useful structure of endogenous enforcement that gives promise of explaining patterns of institutional development.},
}