TY  - JOUR
AU  - Chassang,Sylvain
AU  - Miquel,Gerard Padro i
TI  - Conflict and Deterrence under Strategic Risk
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 13964
PY  - 2008
Y2  - April 2008
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w13964
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w13964.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
Sylvain Chassang
Department of Economics
Bendheim Hall 316
Princeton University
Princeton, NJ 08544-1021
E-Mail: chassang@princeton.edu

Gerard Padro i Miquel
STICERD
London School of Economics
Houghton Street
London, WC2A 2AE
UNITED KINGDOM
Tel: (44) (0) 2078523554
E-Mail: g.padro@lse.ac.uk
AB  - We examine the mechanics of deterrence and intervention when fear is a motive for conflict. We contrast results obtained in a complete information setting, where coordination is easy, to those obtained in a setting with strategic risk, where players have different assessments of their environment. These two strategic settings allow us to define and distinguish predatory and preemptive incentives as determinants of conflict. We show that while weapons have an unambiguous deterrent effect under complete information, this does not hold anymore under strategic risk. Rather, we find that increases in weapon stocks can have a non-monotonic effect on the sustainability of peace. We also show that under strategic risk, inequality in military strength can ac- tually facilitate peace and that anticipated peace-keeping interventions may improve incentives for peaceful behavior.
ER  -