TY  - JOUR
AU  - Iyengar,Radha
AU  - Monten,Jonathan
TI  - Is There an "Emboldenment" Effect? Evidence from the Insurgency in Iraq
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 13839
PY  - 2008
Y2  - March 2008
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w13839
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w13839.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
Radha Iyengar
London School of Economics
Department of Economics
Houghton St
London
WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom
Tel: 44 (0) 20 7852 3563
E-Mail: R.Iyengar1@lse.ac.uk

Jonathan Monten
International Security Program Research Fellow
Belfer Center for Science and International Affair
Kennedy School of Government
Harvard University
79 John F. Kennedy Street, Mailbox 134
Cambridge, MA, 02138
E-Mail: Jonathan_Monten@ksg.harvard.edu
AB  - Are insurgents affected by new information about the United States' sensitivity to costs? Using data on attacks and variation in access to international news across Iraqi provinces, we identify an "emboldenment" effect by comparing the rate of insurgent attacks in areas with higher and lower access to information about U.S news after public statements critical of the war. We find that in periods after a spike in war-critical statements, insurgent attacks increases by 7-10 percent, but that this effect dissipates within a month. Additionally, we find that insurgents shift attacks from Iraqi civilian to U.S. military targets following new information about the United States' sensitivity to costs, resulting in more U.S. fatalities but fewer deaths overall. These results suggest that there is a small but measurable cost to open public debate in the form of higher attacks in the short-term, and that Iraqi insurgent organizations - even those motivated by religious or ideological goals - are strategic actors that respond rationally to the expected probability of US withdrawal. However, the implied costs of open, public debate must be weighed against the potential gains. We conclude that to the extent insurgent groups respond rationally to the incentives set by the policies of pro-government forces, effective counterinsurgency should prioritize manipulating costs and inducements, rather than focus simply on search and destroy missions.
ER  -