TY  - JOUR
AU  - Mulligan,Casey B.
AU  - Tsui,Kevin K.
TI  - Political Entry, Public Policies, and the Economy
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 13830
PY  - 2008
Y2  - March 2008
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w13830
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w13830.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
Casey B. Mulligan
University of Chicago
Department of Economics
1126 East 59th Street
Chicago, IL  60637
Tel: 773/702-9017
Fax: 773/702-8490
E-Mail: c-mulligan@uchicago.edu

Kevin K. Tsui
Sirrine Hall
Clemson, SC  29634
E-Mail: ktsui@clemson.edu
AB  - This paper presents a theory of competition for political leadership between incumbent leaders and their challengers in which the possible equilibrium political market structures range from pure monopoly (unchallenged dictatorship) to perfectly competitive (ideal democracy). Leaders are constrained by the threat of "entry" or their ability to tax (or both), so that regimes with no challengers may nonetheless implement policies in the public interest. We offer economic interpretations of why democratic countries are associated with higher wages, why resource abundant countries tend to be nondemocratic, and how technological change affects political development. By focusing on the incentives for political entry, we show how trade sanctions and other policies designed to promote democracy may actually have the unintended consequences of discouraging political competition.
ER  -