@techreport{NBERw13802,
 title = "Liquidity Risk and Syndicate Structure",
 author = "Evan Gatev and Philip Strahan",
 institution = "National Bureau of Economic Research",
 type = "Working Paper",
 series = "Working Paper Series",
 number = "13802",
 year = "2008",
 month = "February",
 URL = "http://www.nber.org/papers/w13802",
 abstract = {We offer a new explanation of loan syndicate structure based on banks' comparative advantage in managing systematic liquidity risk.  When a syndicated loan to a rated borrower has systematic liquidity risk, the fraction of passive participant lenders that are banks is about 8% higher than for loans without liquidity risk.  In contrast, liquidity risk does not explain the share of banks as lead lenders.  Using a new measure of ex-ante liquidity risk exposure, we find further evidence that syndicate participants specialize in liquidity-risk management while lead banks manage lending relationships.  Links from transactions deposits to liquidity exposure are about 50% larger at participant banks than at lead arrangers.},
}