Liquidity Risk and Syndicate Structure
NBER Working Paper No. 13802
We offer a new explanation of loan syndicate structure based on banks' comparative advantage in managing systematic liquidity risk. When a syndicated loan to a rated borrower has systematic liquidity risk, the fraction of passive participant lenders that are banks is about 8% higher than for loans without liquidity risk. In contrast, liquidity risk does not explain the share of banks as lead lenders. Using a new measure of ex-ante liquidity risk exposure, we find further evidence that syndicate participants specialize in liquidity-risk management while lead banks manage lending relationships. Links from transactions deposits to liquidity exposure are about 50% larger at participant banks than at lead arrangers.
Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w13802
Published: Gatev, Evan & Strahan, Philip E., 2009. "Liquidity risk and syndicate structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(3), pages 490-504, September.
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