TY  - JOUR
AU  - Parsons,Christopher A.
AU  - Sulaeman,Johan
AU  - Yates,Michael C.
AU  - Hamermesh,Daniel S.
TI  - Strike Three: Umpires' Demand for Discrimination
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 13665
PY  - 2007
Y2  - November 2007
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w13665
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w13665.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
Christopher A. Parsons
Department of Finance
McGill University
Montreal, PQ CANADA
E-Mail: christopher.parsons@mcgill.ca

Johan Sulaeman
Department of Finance
University of Texas at Austin
Austin, TX 78712
E-Mail: Johan.Sulaeman@phd.mccombs.utexas.edu

Michael Yates
Department of Finances
Auburn University
Auburn, AL 36849
E-Mail: mcy0002@auburn.edu

Daniel S. Hamermesh
Department of Economics
University of Texas
Austin, TX 78712-1173
Tel: 512/475-8526
Fax: 512/471-3510
E-Mail: hamermes@eco.utexas.edu
AB  - We explore umpires' racial/ethnic preferences in the evaluation of Major League Baseball pitchers.  Controlling for umpire, pitcher, batter and catcher fixed effects and many other factors, strikes are more likely to be called if the umpire and pitcher match race/ethnicity.  This effect only exists where there is little scrutiny of umpires' behavior -- in ballparks without computerized systems monitoring umpires' calls, at poorly attended games, and when the called pitch cannot determine the outcome of the at-bat.  If a pitcher shares the home-plate umpire's race/ethnicity, he gives up fewer runs per game and improves his team's chance of winning.  The results suggest that standard measures of salary discrimination that adjust for measured productivity may generally be flawed. We derive the magnitude of the bias generally and apply it to several examples.
ER  -