TY - JOUR AU - Chetty,Raj AU - Saez,Emmanuel TI - An Agency Theory of Dividend Taxation JF - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series VL - No. 13538 PY - 2007 Y2 - October 2007 UR - http://www.nber.org/papers/w13538 L1 - http://www.nber.org/papers/w13538.pdf N1 - Author contact info: Raj Chetty Department of Economics Harvard University 1805 Cambridge St. Cambridge, MA 02138 Tel: 617-744-9492 E-Mail: chetty@fas.harvard.edu Emmanuel Saez Department of Economics University of California, Berkeley 530 Evans Hall #3880 Berkeley, CA 94720 Tel: 510/642-4631 Fax: 510/642-6615 E-Mail: saez@econ.berkeley.edu AB - Recent empirical studies of dividend taxation have found that: (1) dividend tax cuts cause large, immediate increases in dividend payouts, and (2) the increases are driven by firms with high levels of shareownership among top executives or the board of directors. These findings are inconsistent with existing "old view" and "new view" theories of dividend taxation. We propose a simple alternative theory of dividend taxation in which managers and shareholders have conflicting interests, and show that it can explain the evidence. Using this agency model, we develop an empirically implementable formula for the efficiency cost of dividend taxation. The key determinant of the efficiency cost is the nature of private contracting. If the contract between shareholders and the manager is second-best efficient, deadweight burden follows the standard Harberger formula and is second-order (small) despite the pre-existing distortion of over-investment by the manager. If the contract is second-best inefficient -- as is likely when firms are owned by diffuse shareholders because of incentives to free-ride when monitoring managers -- dividend taxation generates a first-order (large) efficiency cost. An illustrative calibration of the formula using empirical estimates from the 2003 dividend tax reform in the U.S. suggests that the efficiency cost of raising the dividend tax rate could be close to the amount of revenue raised. ER -