What Have We Learned From Market Design?
NBER Working Paper No. 13530
Issued in October 2007
NBER Program(s): HC LS
This essay discusses some things we have learned about markets, in the process of designing marketplaces to fix market failures. To work well, marketplaces have to provide thickness, i.e. they need to attract a large enough proportion of the potential participants in the market; they have to overcome the congestion that thickness can bring, by making it possible to consider enough alternative transactions to arrive at good ones; and they need to make it safe and sufficiently simple to participate in the market, as opposed to transacting outside of the market, or having to engage in costly and risky strategic behavior. I'll draw on recent examples of market design ranging from labor markets for doctors and new economists, to kidney exchange, and school choice in New York City and Boston.
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Machine-readable bibliographic record -
- AlvinE. Roth, 2008. "What Have We Learned from Market Design?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 118(527), pages 285-310, 03.
- Alvin E. Roth, 2008. "What Have We Learned from Market Design?," Innovations: Technology, Governance, Globalization, MIT Press, vol. 3(1), pages 119-147, January.
- Alvin E. Roth, 2009. "What Have We Learned from Market Design?," Innovation Policy and the Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 9(1), pages 79 - 112.
- What Have We Learned from Market Design?, Alvin E. Roth, in Innovation Policy and the Economy, Volume 9 (2008), University of Chicago Press
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