NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

What Have We Learned From Market Design?

Alvin E. Roth

NBER Working Paper No. 13530
Issued in October 2007
NBER Program(s):   HC   LS

This essay discusses some things we have learned about markets, in the process of designing marketplaces to fix market failures. To work well, marketplaces have to provide thickness, i.e. they need to attract a large enough proportion of the potential participants in the market; they have to overcome the congestion that thickness can bring, by making it possible to consider enough alternative transactions to arrive at good ones; and they need to make it safe and sufficiently simple to participate in the market, as opposed to transacting outside of the market, or having to engage in costly and risky strategic behavior. I'll draw on recent examples of market design ranging from labor markets for doctors and new economists, to kidney exchange, and school choice in New York City and Boston.

download in pdf format
   (210 K)

email paper

The NBER Bulletin on Aging and Health provides summaries of publications like this.  You can sign up to receive the NBER Bulletin on Aging and Health by email.

This paper is available as PDF (210 K) or via email.

Acknowledgments

Machine-readable bibliographic record - MARC, RIS, BibTeX

Published:

  • AlvinE. Roth, 2008. "What Have We Learned from Market Design?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 118(527), pages 285-310, 03. ,
  • Alvin E. Roth, 2008. "What Have We Learned from Market Design?," Innovations: Technology, Governance, Globalization, MIT Press, vol. 3(1), pages 119-147, January. ,
  • What Have We Learned from Market Design?, Alvin E. Roth, in Innovation Policy and the Economy, Volume 9 (2008), University of Chicago Press (p. 79 - 112)

Users who downloaded this paper also downloaded these:
Roth What Have We Learned from Market Design?
Roth w13225 Deferred Acceptance Algorithms: History, Theory, Practice, and Open Questions
Kojima, Pathak, and Roth w16028 Matching with Couples: Stability and Incentives in Large Markets
Abdulkadiro─člu, Pathak, and Roth w14864 Strategy-proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the New York City High School Match
Roth w16556 Marketplace Institutions Related to the Timing of Transactions
 
Publications
Activities
Meetings
Data
People
About

Support
National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Ave., Cambridge, MA 02138; 617-868-3900; email: info@nber.org

Contact Us