A Calibratable Model of Optimal CEO Incentives in Market Equilibrium

Alex Edmans, Xavier Gabaix, Augustin Landier

NBER Working Paper No. 13372
Issued in September 2007

---- Acknowledgements -----

For helpful commments, we thank John Core, Carola Frydman, Bob Gibbons, Ben Hermalin (a discussant), Dirk Jenter, Holger Mueller, Michael Roberts, Yuliy Sannikov, Andrei Shleifer, Jeremy Stein, Youngsuk Yook and seminar participants at MIT, NYU and the NBER Summer Institute. XG thanks the NSF (DRU-0527518) for financial support. The views expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research.

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