Strategic Judicial Decision Making

Pablo T. Spiller, Rafael Gely

NBER Working Paper No. 13321
Issued in August 2007
NBER Program(s):   LE   POL

This survey paper starts from the basic, and intuitive, assumption that judges are human and as such, can be modeled in the same fashion we model politicians, activists, managers: driven by well-defined preferences, behaving in a purposive and forward-looking fashion. We explore, then, the role politics play in judicial decision-making. We provide a brief overview of what is called the "strategic approach," compare it to alternative approaches to understand judicial behavior, and offer some concluding thoughts about the future of positive analyses of judicial decision-making.

(75 K)

This paper is available as PDF (75 K) or via email.

Acknowledgments

Machine-readable bibliographic record - MARC, RIS, BibTeX