NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

Optimal Reserve Management and Sovereign Debt

Laura Alfaro, Fabio Kanczuk

NBER Working Paper No. 13216
Issued in July 2007
NBER Program(s):   IFM   PE

To study the joint decision of holding sovereign debt and reserves, we construct a stochastic dynamic equilibrium model that incorporates willingness-to-pay incentive problems. In this setup, debt and assets are not perfect substitutes, as reserves can be used even after a country has defaulted. We calibrate the model to a sample of emerging markets. We obtain that the reserve accumulation does not play a quantitatively important role in this model. In fact, the optimal policy is not to hold reserves at all. This finding is robust to considering interest rate shocks, sudden stops, contingent reserves and reserve dependent output costs.

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This paper was revised on October 7, 2008

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Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w13216

Published: Alfaro, Laura & Kanczuk, Fabio, 2009. "Optimal reserve management and sovereign debt," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 23-36, February.

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