NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

Factions and Political Competition

Nicola Persico, José Carlos Rodríguez-Pueblita, Dan Silverman

NBER Working Paper No. 13008
Issued in April 2007
NBER Program(s):   PE   POL

This paper presents a new model of political competition where candidates belong to factions. Before elections, factions compete to direct local public goods to their local constituencies. The model of factional competition delivers a rich set of implications relating the internal organization of the party to the allocation of resources. Several key theoretical predictions of the model find a counterpart in our empirical analysis of newly coded data on the provision of water services in Mexico.

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This paper was revised on March 27, 2008

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Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w13008

Published: Persico, Nicola, José C. R. Pueblita and Dan Silverman. “Factions and Political Competition." Journal of Political Economy 119, 2 (April 2011): 242-288. citation courtesy of

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