@techreport{NBERw12827,
 title = "Self-Protection and Insurance with Interdependencies",
 author = "Alexander Muermann and Howard Kunreuther",
 institution = "National Bureau of Economic Research",
 type = "Working Paper",
 series = "Working Paper Series",
 number = "12827",
 year = "2007",
 month = "January",
 URL = "http://www.nber.org/papers/w12827",
 abstract = {We study optimal investment in self-protection of insured individuals when they face interdependencies in the form of potential contamination from others. If individuals cannot coordinate their actions, then the positive externality of investing in self-protection implies that, in equilibrium, individuals underinvest in self-protection. Limiting insurance coverage through deductibles can partially internalize this externality and thereby improve individual and social welfare.},
}