NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

Self-Protection and Insurance with Interdependencies

Alexander Muermann, Howard Kunreuther

NBER Working Paper No. 12827
Issued in January 2007
NBER Program(s):   PE

We study optimal investment in self-protection of insured individuals when they face interdependencies in the form of potential contamination from others. If individuals cannot coordinate their actions, then the positive externality of investing in self-protection implies that, in equilibrium, individuals underinvest in self-protection. Limiting insurance coverage through deductibles can partially internalize this externality and thereby improve individual and social welfare.

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Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w12827

Published: Alexander Muermann & Howard Kunreuther, 2008. "Self-protection and insurance with interdependencies," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 36(2), pages 103-123, April.

 
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