A Comment Concerning Deposit Insurance and Moral Hazard
|
NBER Working Paper No. 12719
Issued in December 2006
NBER Program(s): DAE CF ME
Hooks and Robinson argue that moral hazard induced by deposit insurance induced banks to invest in riskier assets in Texas during the 1920s. Their regressions suggest this manifestation of moral hazard may explain a portion of the events that occurred during the 1920s, but some other phenomena, hitherto overlooked, must also be at work. Economic logic and evidence form the archives of the Board of Governors suggest that phenomenon is mismanagement and defalcation by corporate officers, which increases when insurance reduces depositors' incentives to monitor and react to the safety and soundness of banks.
This paper is available as PDF (57 K) or via email.
Acknowledgments
Machine-readable bibliographic record -
MARC,
RIS,
BibTeX
|
|
|
About
Support
The research activities of the NBER are funded by grants from federal research agencies, by private foundations, and by generous donations from our corporate associates and from private individuals. The NBER is a non-profit, 501(c)(3) organization. For information on supporting the NBER, please contact:
Mr. Denis Healy, Director of Development
NBER
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138-5398
ph: 617-868-3900
email: dhealy@nber.org
Close
