TY  - JOUR
AU  - Laeven,Luc
AU  - Levine,Ross
TI  - Complex Ownership Structures and Corporate Valuations
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 12675
PY  - 2006
Y2  - November 2006
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w12675
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w12675.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
Luc Laeven
Senior Economist
International Monetary Fund
700 19th Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20431
Tel: 202/623-9020
Fax: 202/623-4740
E-Mail: Llaeven@imf.org

Ross Levine
Department of Economics
Brown University
64 Waterman Street
Providence, RI 02912
Tel: 401/863-2170
E-Mail: ross_levine@brown.edu
AB  - The bulk of corporate governance theory examines the agency problems that arise from two extreme ownership structures: 100 percent small shareholders or one large, controlling owner combined with small shareholders. In this paper, we question the empirical validity of this dichotomy. In fact, one-third of publicly listed firms in Europe have multiple large owners, and the market value of firms with multiple blockholders differs from firms with a single large owner and from widely-held firms. Moreover, the relationship between corporate valuations and the distribution of cash-flow rights across multiple large owners is consistent with the predictions of recent theoretical models.
ER  -