@techreport{NBERw12675,
 title = "Complex Ownership Structures and Corporate Valuations",
 author = "Luc Laeven and Ross Levine",
 institution = "National Bureau of Economic Research",
 type = "Working Paper",
 series = "Working Paper Series",
 number = "12675",
 year = "2006",
 month = "November",
 URL = "http://www.nber.org/papers/w12675",
 abstract = {The bulk of corporate governance theory examines the agency problems that arise from two extreme ownership structures: 100 percent small shareholders or one large, controlling owner combined with small shareholders. In this paper, we question the empirical validity of this dichotomy. In fact, one-third of publicly listed firms in Europe have multiple large owners, and the market value of firms with multiple blockholders differs from firms with a single large owner and from widely-held firms. Moreover, the relationship between corporate valuations and the distribution of cash-flow rights across multiple large owners is consistent with the predictions of recent theoretical models.},
}