NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

Strategic Incompatibility in ATM Markets

Christopher R. Knittel, Victor Stango

NBER Working Paper No. 12604
Issued in October 2006
NBER Program(s):   IO   LE

We test whether firms use incompatibility strategically, using data from ATM markets. High ATM fees degrade the value of competitors' deposit accounts, and can in principle serve as a mechanism for siphoning depositors away from competitors or for creating deposit account differentiation. Our empirical framework can empirically distinguish surcharging motivated by this strategic concern from surcharging that simply maximizes ATM profit considered as a stand-alone operation. The results are consistent with such behavior by large banks, but not by small banks. For large banks, the effect of incompatibility seems to operate through higher deposit account fees rather than increased deposit account base.

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Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w12604

Published: Knittel, Christopher and Victor Stango. "Strategic Incompatibility in ATM Markets." Journal of Banking and Finance. Volume 35, Issue 10, October 2011, Pages 2627-2636.

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