NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

The Control of Politicians in Divided Societies: The Politics of Fear

Gerard Padro i Miquel

NBER Working Paper No. 12573
Issued in October 2006
NBER Program(s):   POL

Autocrats in many developing countries have extracted enormous personal rents from power. In addition, they have imposed inefficient policies including pervasive patronage spending. I present a model in which the presence of ethnic identities and the absence of institutionalized succession processes allow the ruler to elicit support from a sizeable share of the population despite large reductions in welfare. The fear of falling under an equally inefficient and venal ruler that favors another group is enough to discipline supporters. The model predicts extensive use of patronage, ethnic bias in taxation and spending patterns and unveils a new mechanism through which economic frictions translate into increased rent extraction by the leader. These predictions are consistent with the experiences of bad governance, ethnic bias, wasteful policies and kleptocracy in post-colonial Africa.

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Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w12573

Published: Padro i Miquel, Gerard. "The Control of Politicians in Divided Societies: The Politics of Fear." Review of Economic Studies 74, 4 (October 2007): 1259-74.

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