NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

The Corporate Governance Role of the Media: Evidence from Russia

Alexander Dyck, Natalya Volchkova, Luigi Zingales

NBER Working Paper No. 12525
Issued in September 2006
NBER Program(s):   CF

We study the effect of media coverage on corporate governance by focusing on Russia in the period 1999-2002. This setting offers us three ideal conditions for such a study: plenty of corporate governance violations, no alternative mechanisms to address them, and the presence of an investment fund (the Hermitage) that actively lobbies the international press to shame companies perpetrating those violations. We find that Hermitage’s lobbying is effective in increasing the coverage of corporate governance violations in the Anglo-American press. We also find that coverage in the Anglo-American press increases the probability that a corporate governance violation is reversed. This effect is present even when we instrument coverage with an exogenous determinant, i.e. the Hermitage’s portfolio composition at the beginning of the period. The Hermitage’s strategy seems to work in part by impacting Russian companies’ reputation abroad and in part by forcing regulators into action.

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Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w12525

Published: Alexander Dyck & Natalya Volchkova & Luigi Zingales, 2008. "The Corporate Governance Role of the Media: Evidence from Russia," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 63(3), pages 1093-1135, 06. citation courtesy of

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