Education and Labor-Market Discrimination
Kevin Lang, Michael Manove
NBER Working Paper No. 12257
We propose a model that combines statistical discrimination and educational sorting that explains why blacks get more education than do whites of similar cognitive ability. Our model explains the difference between blacks and whites in the relations between education and AFQT and between wages and education. It cannot easily explain why, conditional only on AFQT, blacks earn no more than do whites. It does, however, suggest, that when comparing the earnings of blacks and whites, one should control for both AFQT and education in which case a substantial black-white wage differential reemerges. We explore and reject the hypothesis that differences in school quality between blacks and whites explain the wage and education diﬀerentials. Our findings support the view that some of the black-white wage diﬀerential reflects the operation of the labor market.
Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w12257
Published: Kevin Lang & Michael Manove, 2011. "Education and Labor Market Discrimination," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(4), pages 1467-96, June. citation courtesy of
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