TY  - JOUR
AU  - Mas,Alexandre
TI  - Pay, Reference Points, and Police Performance
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 12202
PY  - 2006
Y2  - May 2006
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w12202
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w12202.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
Alexandre Mas
Industrial Relations Section
Firestone Library
Princeton University
Princeton, NJ 08544
Tel: 609/258-6374
E-Mail: amas@princeton.edu
M2  - featured in NBER digest on 2007-01-01
AB  - Several theories suggest that pay raises below a reference point will reduce job performance.  Final offer arbitration for police unions provides a unique opportunity to examine these theories, as the police officers either receive their requested wage or receive a lower one.  In the months after New Jersey police officers lose in arbitration, arrest rates and average sentence length decline and crime reports rise relative to when they win.  These declines are larger when the awarded wage is further from the police union's demand.  The findings support the idea that considerations of fairness, disappointment, and, more generally, reference points affect workplace behavior.
ER  -