TY  - JOUR
AU  - Jagannathan,Ravi
AU  - Sherman,Ann E.
TI  - Why Do IPO Auctions Fail?
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 12151
PY  - 2006
Y2  - April 2006
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w12151
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w12151.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
Ravi Jagannathan
Kellogg Graduate School of Management
Northwestern University
2001 Sheridan Road
Leverone/Anderson Complex
Evanston, IL 60208-2001
Tel: 847/491-8338
Fax: 847/491-5719
E-Mail: rjaganna@northwestern.edu

Ann Sherman
University of Notre Dame
Department of Finance
P.O. Box 399
Notre Dame, IN 46556-0399
AB  - We document a somewhat surprising regularity:  of the many countries that have used IPO auctions, virtually all have abandoned them.  The common explanations given for the lack of popularity of the auction method in the US, viz., issuer reluctance to try a new experimental method, and underwriter pressure towards methods that lead to higher fees, do not fit the evidence.  We examine why auctions have failed and verify, to the extent possible, that they are consistent with what academic theory predicts.  Both uniform price and discriminatory auctions are plagued by unexpectedly large fluctuations in the number of participants.  The free rider problem and the winner's curse hamper price discovery and discourage investors from participating in auctions.  Calculating the optimal bids in large multi-unit common value auctions with endogenous entry imposes a huge computational burden.  With IPOs taking place sporadically, and each firm being different, auctions are likely to end up being unstable.
ER  -