@techreport{NBERw12049,
 title = "Who Adjusts and When? On the Political Economy of Reforms",
 author = "Alberto Alesina and Silvia Ardagna and Francesco Trebbi",
 institution = "National Bureau of Economic Research",
 type = "Working Paper",
 series = "Working Paper Series",
 number = "12049",
 year = "2006",
 month = "February",
 URL = "http://www.nber.org/papers/w12049",
 abstract = {Why do countries delay stabilizations of large and increasing budget deficits and inflation? And what explains the timing of reforms? We use the war of attrition model as a guidance for our empirical study on a vast sample of countries. We find that stabilizations are more likely to occur when time of crisis occur, at the beginning of term of office of a new government, in countries with "strong" governments (i.e. presidential systems and unified governments with a large majority of the party in office), and when the executive faces less constraints. The role of external inducements like IMF programs has at best a weak effect, but problem of reverse causality are possible.},
}