TY  - JOUR
AU  - Abdulkadiroglu,Atila
AU  - Pathak,Parag
AU  - Roth,Alvin E.
AU  - Sonmez,Tayfun
TI  - Changing the Boston School Choice Mechanism
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 11965
PY  - 2006
Y2  - January 2006
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w11965
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w11965.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
Atila Abdulkadiroğlu
Duke University
Department of Economics
Durham, NC 27708
E-Mail: atila.abdulkadiroglu@duke.edu

Parag Pathak
MIT Department of Economics
50 Memorial Drive
E52-391C
Cambridge, MA 02142
Tel: 617/253-7458
E-Mail: ppathak@mit.edu

Alvin E. Roth
Department of Economics
Stanford University
579 Serra Mall
Stanford, CA 94305
Tel: 650/725-9147
E-Mail: alroth@stanford.edu

Tayfun Sonmez
Boston College
Department of Economics
140 Comm. Ave.
Chestnut Hill, MA, 02467
E-Mail: tayfun.sonmez@bc.edu
AB  - In July 2005 the Boston School Committee voted to replace the existing Boston school choice mechanism with a deferred acceptance mechanism that simplifies the strategic choices facing parents. This paper presents the empirical case against the previous Boston mechanism, a priority matching mechanism, and the case in favor of the change to a strategy-proof mechanism. Using detailed records on student choices and assignments, we present evidence both of sophisticated strategic behavior among some parents, and of unsophisticated strategic behavior by others. We find evidence that some parents pay close attention to the capacity constraints of different schools, while others appear not to. In particular, we show that many unassigned students could have been assigned to one of their stated choices with a different strategy under the current mechanism. This interaction between sophisticated and unsophisticated players identifies a new rationale for strategy-proof mechanisms based on fairness, and was a critical argument in Boston's decision to change the mechanism. We then discuss the considerations that led to the adoption of a deferred acceptance mechanism as opposed to the (also strategy-proof) top trading cycles mechanism.
ER  -