TY  - JOUR
AU  - Brander,James A.
AU  - Krugman,Paul
TI  - A 'Reciprocal Dumping' Model of International Trade
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 1194
PY  - 1983
Y2  - August 1983
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w1194
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w1194.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
James A. Brander
University of British Columbia
Faculty of Commerce
2053 Main Mall
Vancouver, B.C. V6T 1Z2  CANADA
Tel: 604/822-8483
Fax: 604/822-8477
E-Mail: brander@sauder.ubc.ca

Paul R. Krugman
Department of Economics
Princeton University
Woodrow Wilson School
Princeton, NJ  08544
Tel: 609/258-4570
Fax: 609/258-2809
E-Mail: pkrugman@princeton.edu
AB  - This paper develops a model in which the rivalry of oligopolistic firms serves as an independent cause of international trade. The model shows how such rivalry naturally gives rise to "dumping" of output in foreign markets, and shows that such dumping can be "reciprocal" -- that is, there may be two-way trade in the same product. Reciprocal dumpingis shown to be possible for fairly general specification of firm behaviour.The welfare effects of this seemingly pointless trade are ambiguous. On one hand, resources are wasted in the cross-handling of goods; on the other hand, increased competition reduces monopoly distortions. Surprisingly,in the case of free entry and Cournot behaviour reciprocal dumping is unanibiuously beneficial.
ER  -