@techreport{NBERw11829,
 title = "The Effect of Firm-Level Contracts on the Structure of Wages: Evidence from Matched Employer-Employee Data",
 author = "David Card and Sara de la Rica",
 institution = "National Bureau of Economic Research",
 type = "Working Paper",
 series = "Working Paper Series",
 number = "11829",
 year = "2005",
 month = "December",
 URL = "http://www.nber.org/papers/w11829",
 abstract = {In many European countries sectoral bargaining agreements are automatically extended to cover all firms in an industry. Employers and employees can also negotiate firm-specific contracts. We use a large matched employer-employee data set from Spain to study the effects of firm-level contracting on the structure of wages. We estimate a series of wage determination models, including specifications that control for individual characteristics, co-worker characteristics, the bargaining status of the workplace, and the probability the workplace is covered by a firm-level contract. We find that firm-level contracting is associated with a 5-10 percent wage premium, with larger premiums for more highly paid workers. Although we cannot decisively test between alternative explanations for the firm-level contracting premium, workers with firm-specific contracts have significantly longer job tenure, suggesting that the premium is at least partially a non-competitive phenomenon.},
}