NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

Minorities and Storable Votes

Alessandra Casella, Thomas Palfrey, Raymond Riezman

NBER Working Paper No. 11674
Issued in October 2005
NBER Program(s):   ME   PE

The paper studies a simple voting system that has the potential to increase the power of minorities without sacrificing aggregate efficiency. Storable votes grant each voter a stock of votes to spend as desidered over a series of binary decisions. By cumulating votes on issues that it deems most important, the minority can win occasionally. But because the majority typically can outvote it, the minority wins only of its strength of preferences is high and the majority's strength of preferences is low. The result is that aggregate efficiency either falls little or in fact rises. The theoretical predictions are confirmed by a series of experiments: the frequency of minority victories, the relative payoff of the minority versus the majority, and the aggregate payoffs all match the theory.

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Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w11674

Published: Casella, Alessandra & Palfrey, Thomas & Riezman, Raymond, 2008. "Minorities and Storable Votes," International Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 3(2), pages 165-200, July.

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