TY  - JOUR
AU  - Bajari,Patrick
AU  - Fox,Jeremy T.
TI  - Measuring the Efficiency of an FCC Spectrum Auction
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 11671
PY  - 2005
Y2  - October 2005
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w11671
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w11671.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
Patrick Bajari
University of Washington
331 Savery Hall
UW Economics Box 353330
Seattle, Washington 98195-3330
E-Mail: Bajari@uw.edu

Jeremy T. Fox
Economics Department
University of Michigan
238 Lorch Hall
611 Tappan Ave
Ann Arbor, MI 48109
Tel: 734-330-2854
Fax: 734-274-2331
E-Mail: jeremyfox@gmail.com
AB  - FCC spectrum auctions sell licenses to provide mobile phone service in designated geographic territories. We propose a method to structurally estimate the deterministic component of bidder valuations and apply it to the 1995–1996 C-block auction. We base our estimation of bidder values on a pairwise stability condition, which implies that two bidders cannot exchange licenses in a way that increases total surplus. Pairwise stability holds in many theoretical models of simultaneous ascending auctions, including some models of intimidatory collusion and demand reduction. Pairwise stability is also approximately satisfied in data that we examine from economic experiments. The lack of post-auction resale also suggests pairwise stability. Using our estimates of deterministic valuations, we measure the allocative efficiency of the C-block outcome.
ER  -