NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

Venture Capital Contracting and Syndication: An Experiment in Computational Corporate Finance

Zsuzsanna Fluck, Kedran Garrison, Stewart C. Myers

NBER Working Paper No. 11624
Issued in September 2005
NBER Program(s):   CF

This paper develops a model to study how entrepreneurs and venture-capital investors deal with moral hazard, effort provision, asymmetric information and hold-up problems. We explore several financing scenarios, including first-best, monopolistic, syndicated and fully competitive financing. We solve numerically for the entrepreneur's effort, the terms of financing, the venture capitalist's investment decision and NPV. We find significant value losses due to holdup problems and under-provision of effort that can outweigh the benefits of staged financing and investment. We show that a commitment to later-stage syndicate financing increases effort and NPV and preserves the option value of staged investment. This commitment benefits initial venture capital investors as well as the entrepreneur.

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Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w11624

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