TY  - JOUR
AU  - Svensson,Lars E.O.
TI  - Social Value of Public Information: Morris and Shin (2002) Is Actually Pro Transparency, Not Con
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 11537
PY  - 2005
Y2  - August 2005
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w11537
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w11537.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
Lars E.O. Svensson
Sveriges Riksbank
SE-103 37 Stockholm
SWEDEN
Tel: +46 8 787 0107
Fax: +46 8 21 0531
E-Mail: lars.svensson@iies.su.se
M2  - featured in NBER digest on 2005-08-08
AB  - The main result of Morris and Shin (2002) (restated in papers by Amato, Morris, and Shin (2002) and Amato and Shin (2003) and commented upon by Economist (2004)) has been presented and interpreted as an anti-transparency result: more public information can be bad. However, some scrutiny of the result shows that it is actually pro transparency: except in very special circumstances, more public information is good. Furthermore, for a conservative benchmark of equal precision in public and private information, social welfare is higher than in a situation without public information.
ER  -