NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

Social Value of Public Information: Morris and Shin (2002) Is Actually Pro Transparency, Not Con

Lars E.O. Svensson

NBER Working Paper No. 11537
Issued in August 2005
NBER Program(s):   ME

The main result of Morris and Shin (2002) (restated in papers by Amato, Morris, and Shin (2002) and Amato and Shin (2003) and commented upon by Economist (2004)) has been presented and interpreted as an anti-transparency result: more public information can be bad. However, some scrutiny of the result shows that it is actually pro transparency: except in very special circumstances, more public information is good. Furthermore, for a conservative benchmark of equal precision in public and private information, social welfare is higher than in a situation without public information.

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Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w11537

Published: Svensson, Lars E. O. "Social Value of Public Information: Morris and Shin (2002) Is Actually Pro Transparency, Not Con." American Economic Review Vol. 96, No. 1, Mar., 2006

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