TY  - JOUR
AU  - Bénabou,Roland
AU  - Tirole,Jean
TI  - Incentives and Prosocial Behavior
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 11535
PY  - 2005
Y2  - August 2005
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w11535
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w11535.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
Roland Benabou
Department of Economics
and Woodrow Wilson School
Princeton University
Princeton, NJ 08544
Tel: 609/258-3672
Fax: 609/258-5533
E-Mail: rbenabou@princeton.edu

Jean Tirole
Institut d'Economie Industrielle
Bureau MF529 - Bat. F
21 allees de Brienne
31000 Toulouse
FRANCE
Tel: 33-561-128642
E-Mail: tirole@cict.fr
M2  - featured in NBER digest on 2005-08-08
AB  - We develop a theory of prosocial behavior that combines heterogeneity in individual altruism and greed with concerns for social reputation or self-respect. Rewards or punishments (whether material or image-related) create doubt about the true motive for which good deeds are performed and this "overjustification effect" can induce a partial or even net crowding out of prosocial behavior by extrinsic incentives. We also identify settings that are conducive to multiple social norms and those where disclosing one's generosity may backfire. Finally, we analyze the choice by public and private sponsors of incentive levels, their degree of confidentiality and the publicity given to agents' behavior. Sponsor competition is shown to potentially reduce social welfare.
ER  -